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That ‘70s Show: Why the 11th Circuit was
Wrong to Rely on Cases from the 1970s to
Decide a Cell-Phone Tracking Case
DAVID OSCAR MARKUS AND NATHAN FREED WESSLER
In light of society's increasing reliance on technology, this
article explores a critical question – that of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection over privacy in the digital age. Specifically, this article addresses how the law currently fails to
protect the privacy of one’s cell phone records and its ramifications. By highlighting the antiquated precedent leading
up to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Davis,
this article calls on the judiciary to find a more appropriate
balance for protecting the right to privacy in a modern society.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) was passed in
1986, cell phones cost over $3,000 and were the size of a brick.1
Less than one-half of one percent of the U.S. population owned one.2
There were only 1,000 cell phone towers in the United States.3 A lot
has changed since then. Now, almost everyone carries a cell phone,
which can be tracked by our Government.
In Quartavius Davis’s case, as in thousands of cases each year,
the government sought and obtained the cell phone location data of
a private individual pursuant to a disclosure order under the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) rather than by securing a warrant.4 Under the SCA, a disclosure order does not require a finding of probable cause.5 Instead, the SCA authorizes the issuance of a disclosure
order whenever the government “offers specific and articulable facts

1

See Stephanie Buck, Cell-ebration! 40 Years of Cellphone History,
MASHABLE (Apr. 3, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/04/03/anniversary-of-cellphone/#yNM8b.X2DEqX.
2
See Andrea Meyer, 30th Anniversary of the First Commercial Cell Phone
Call, VERIZON (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.verizonwireless.com/news/article/2013/10/30th-anniversary-cell-phone.html.
3
See id.
4
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Mr. Davis’s first name was misspelled in the case caption. It is Quartavius, not Quartavious. Id. at 500 n.1.
5
Id. at 502.
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showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”6
As a result, the district court never made a probable cause finding before ordering Davis’ service provider to disclose 67 days of
Davis’ cell phone location records, including more than 11,000 separate location data points.7 Reversing a unanimous panel opinion, a
majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in these location records and, even if
there were such an expectation, a warrantless search would be reasonable nonetheless.8
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Davis was wrong—the
warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the
course of 67 days is not permitted by the Fourth Amendment.
I.
THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. DAVIS
United States v. Davis presents a critical question: does the
Fourth Amendment prevent the warrantless acquisition of electronic
records which reveal the locations and movements of people over
time?9
Davis’ petition for certiorari summarized the facts of the case as
follows:
In February 2011, in the course of an investigation
into seven armed robberies that occurred in the
greater Miami area in 2010, an Assistant United
States Attorney submitted to a federal magistrate
judge an application for an order granting access to
67 days of Quartavius Davis’s historical cell-phone
location records. The application, which was unsworn, did not seek a warrant based on probable

6
7
8
9

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
Davis, 785 F.3d at 502–03, 505–06.
Id. at 516–18.
Id. at 500.
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cause, but rather an order under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Such an order
may issue when the government offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the records sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
The application sought to compel a number of cellular service providers to disclose records related to
several suspects in the robberies, including Davis.
Specifically, the application sought stored telephone
subscriber records, and phone toll records, including
the corresponding geographic location data (cell
site). The application recited information regarding
robberies of retail businesses that occurred on August 7, August 31, September 7, September 15, September 25, September 26, and October 1, 2010, in
and around Miami, Florida, and asserted that the records sought were relevant to the investigation of
those offenses. Rather than restricting the request to
only the days on which the robberies occurred, however, the application sought records for the period
from August 1, 2010 through October 6, 2010, a total
of 67 days.
The magistrate judge issued an Order for Stored Cell
Site Information on February 2, 2011. The order directed MetroPCS, Davis’s cellular service provider,
to produce all telephone toll records and geographic
location data (cell site) for Davis’s phone for the period of August 1 through October 6, 2010. MetroPCS
complied, providing 183 pages of Davis’s cell phone
records to the government. Those records show each
of Davis’s incoming and outgoing calls during the
67-day period, along with the cell tower (“cell site”)
and directional sector of the tower that Davis’s phone
connected to at the start and end of most of the calls,
which was typically the nearest and strongest tower.
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MetroPCS also produced a list of its cell sites in Florida, providing the longitude, latitude, and physical
address of each cell site, along with the directional
orientation of each sector antenna. By cross-referencing the information in Davis’s call detail records
with MetroPCS’s cell-site list, the government could
identify the area in which Davis’s phone was located
and could thereby deduce Davis’s location and
movements at multiple points each day.10
The size of the cell site sectors in a particular area is a substantial
determinant in the precision of a cell phone user’s location as reported in cell site location information (“CSLI”) records.11 While
the existence of towers with six sectors is becoming more prevalent,
most cell sites contain three directional antennas, dividing the cell
site into three sectors.12 In geographic areas in which there is a
greater density of cell towers, the coverage area of each cell site sector is smaller. As a result, urban areas that have the greatest density
have the smallest coverage areas.13
As data usage grows with the increasing adoption of
smartphones, cell site density continues to increase.14 Carriers must
erect additional cell sites to accommodate increased usage for text
messages, emails, web browsing, streaming video, etc., as each cell
site accommodates a fixed volume of data.15 As a result, in dense
10

Petition for Certiorari, Davis v. United States, 2015 WL 4607865, at *4-*6
(“Davis Petition”). The authors of this article were counsel for Mr. Davis on his
petition for certiorari. This article expands on their work in the petition.
11
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928 (11th Cir. Jun
01, 2012).
12
Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 (Martin, J., dissenting).
13
Id. at 503. For example, in 2010, MetroPCS, the carrier used by Davis,
operated a total of 214 cell sites comprising 714 sector antennas within MiamiDade County. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 21, at 14.
14
See Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA (June 2015),
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey.
15
See id. (showing that the number of cell sites in the United States nearly
doubled from 2003 to 2013). Id. (wireless data usage increased by 9,228% between 2009 and 2013).
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urban and suburban areas such as Miami, there are numerous sectors
that cover small geographic areas, which as a result offer fairly precise information about a phone’s location.16
In this particular case, the information provided by MetroPCS
consisted solely of information identifying Davis’s cell site and sector at the beginning and end of his calls. But carriers are developing
the capability to store ever more precise location data. 17 As carriers
implement millions of “small cells,” which provide service to areas
as small as ten meters, location precision is further increasing.18
These “small cells” permit callers to be located with a “‘high degree
of precision, sometimes effectively identifying individual floors and
rooms within buildings.’”19
In this case, the government obtained call detail records from
Davis’ phone that contained a wealth of location data. The “CSLI”
provided by these records pertained to 5,803 phone calls, and revealed 11,606 individual location data points (because cell site location information was recorded at the start and end of each of the
calls).20 “This averages around one location data point every five
and one half minutes for those sixty-seven days, assuming Mr. Davis
slept eight hours a night.”21 Much sensitive and private information
about Davis was revealed through this information about his locations, movements, and associations:
The amount and type of data at issue revealed so
much information about Mr. Davis’s day-to-day life
that most of us would consider quintessentially private. For instance, on August 13, 2010, Mr. Davis
made or received 108 calls in 22 unique cell site sectors, showing his movements throughout Miami during that day. And the record reflects that many phone
calls began within one cell site sector and ended in
16

See Davis, 785 F.3d at 503.
See, e.g., Verizon Wireless, Law Enforcement Resource Team (LERT)
Guide, PUB. INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 20, 2009), http://publicintelligence.net/verizonwireless-law-enforcement-resource-team-lert-guide/ (providing sample records
indicating caller’s distance from cell site to within .1 of a mile).
18
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 11, at 10–11.
19
Id.
20
Davis, 785 F.3d at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting).
21
Id. at 540 (Martin, J., dissenting).
17
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another, exposing his movements even during the
course of a single phone call.
Also, by focusing on the first and last calls in a day,
law enforcement could determine from the location
data where Mr. Davis lived, where he slept, and
whether those two locations were the same. As a government witness testified at trial, “if you look at the
majority of . . . calls over a period of time when
somebody wakes up and when somebody goes to
sleep, normally it is fairly simple to decipher where
their home tower would be.” Trial Tr. 42, Feb. 7,
2012, ECF No. 285. For example, from August 2,
2010, to August 31, 2010, Mr. Davis’s first and last
call of the day were either or both placed from a single sector—purportedly his home sector. But on the
night of September 2, 2010, Mr. Davis made calls at
11:41pm, 6:52am, and 10:56am—all from a location
that was not his home sector. Just as Justice Sotomayor warned [in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012)], Mr. Davis’s “movements [were] recorded and aggregated in a manner that enable[d] the
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, . . .
[his] sexual habits, and so on.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).22
As a result of this substantial invasion of Davis’s privacy, he
moved before trial to suppress these CSLI records, arguing that the
government needed a warrant to obtain the records under the Fourth
Amendment.23 The district court summarily denied David’s motion
at the conclusion of the suppression hearing. The court indicated
that it would subsequently issue a written opinion.24 During trial,
Davis renewed the suppression motion, but it again was summarily

22
23
24

Id. at 540–41 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 503.
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2014).
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denied by the court with the promise of a subsequent written opinion.25 The court never issued any written opinion explaining its denial of the motion.26
The case proceeded to trial:
At trial, the government introduced the entirety of
Davis’s CSLI records as evidence, and relied on
them to establish Davis’s location on the days of the
charged robberies. A detective with the Miami-Dade
Police Department testified that Davis’s CSLI records placed him near the sites of six of the robberies.
The detective also produced maps showing the location of Davis’s phone relative to the locations of the
robberies, which the government introduced into evidence. Thus, the government relied upon the information it got from MetroPCS to specifically pin Mr.
Davis’s location at a particular site in Miami. The
prosecutor asserted to the trial judge, for example,
that Mr. Davis’s phone was literally right up against
the America Gas Station immediately preceding and
after the robbery occurred, and argued to the jury in
closing that the records put Davis literally right on
top of the Advance Auto Parts one minute before that
robbery took place.
The jury convicted Davis of two counts of conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by threats
or violence in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a); seven Hobbs Act robbery offenses; and
seven counts of using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in each robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). All but the first of the § 924(c) convictions
carried mandatory consecutive minimum sentences
of 25 years each. As a result, the court sentenced Davis to nearly 162 years’ imprisonment. The court
stated at sentencing that in light of Davis’s young age
(18 and 19 years old at the time of the offenses) and
25
26

Id.
Id.
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the nature of the crimes, the court believed a sentence
of 40 years would have been appropriate. Because
the court was afforded no discretion in sentencing,
however, it sentenced Davis to 162 years in prison.27
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, a unanimous three-judge
panel held that the government violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment
rights by requesting and obtaining his historical cell site location information without a warrant.28 Judge Sentelle,29 the opinion’s author, stated that Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
CSLI because this data revealed information about his whereabouts
in private locations, thereby “convert[ing] what would otherwise be
a private event into a public one.”30 As the opinion explained,
“[t]here is a reasonable privacy interest in being near the home of a
lover, or a dispensary of medication, or a place of worship, or a
house of ill repute.”31 It further held that the cellular carrier’s possession of Davis’s CSLI did not deprive Davis of a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information because his location was not
voluntarily provided to MetroPCS.32 The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed the district court’s denial of Davis’s suppression motion on the basis that the government relied in good faith on the magistrate judge’s order issued under the Stored Communications Act.
It found that the exclusionary rule therefore did not apply.33
On en banc rehearing, a divided Eleventh Circuit vacated the
panel opinion.34 In the majority opinion, Judge Hull held that Davis

27
28

Davis Petition at *10-*11 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Id. at 1217.
Judge Sentelle sat on the panel by designation from the D.C. Circuit.
Judges Martin and Dubina joined Judge Sentelle’s opinion.
30
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1217.
33
Id. at 1217–18.
34
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12 n.10, Quartavious Davis v. United
States of America, 785 F.3d at 541 (No. 15-146) (“Only one member of the original panel participated in en banc reconsideration. Judge Sentelle was not permitted to participate because he had participated in the panel as a visitor from the
D.C. Circuit. Judge Dubina has taken senior status, and opted not to participate in
29
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had no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone location records held by MetroPCS, and therefore no Fourth Amendment search
occurred.35 Judge Hull concluded that use of an SCA order rather
than a warrant is reasonable, even if there was a Fourth Amendment
search, because of the government’s compelling interest in investigating crimes and because the privacy intrusion was minor.36
Five of the en banc court’s eleven judges diverged from this reasoning. Judge Jordan, joined by Judge Wilson, wrote separately to
express the concern that
[a]s technology advances, location information from
cellphones (and, of course, smartphones) will undoubtedly become more precise and easier to obtain,
and if there is no expectation of privacy here, I have
some concerns about the government being able to
conduct 24/7 electronic tracking (live or historical)
in the years to come without an appropriate judicial
order.37
Although Judge Jordan did not join the court’s conclusion that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI records, he
concurred that (if conducted with an SCA order) a search of CSLI
is reasonable.38
Judge Rosenbaum also wrote separately, offering a note of caution:
In our time, unless a person is willing to live “off the
grid,” it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the
most personal of information to third-party service
providers on a constant basis, just to navigate daily
life. And the thought that the government should be
able to access such information without the basic

en banc reconsideration. See 11th Cir. R. 35-10.”). See also United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
35
Davis, 785 F.3d at 515–16.
36
Id. at 517–18. The court held in the alternative that the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule applies. Id. at 518 n.20.
37
Id. at 521 (Jordan, J., concurring).
38
Id. at 522–23 (Jordan, J., concurring).
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protection that a warrant offers is nothing less than
chilling.39
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Martin, joined by Judge Jill Pryor,
contended that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI,
and that the government should be required to obtain a warrant before accessing this information.40
II.
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION WAS WRONG.
In two recent landmark cases, the Supreme Court has addressed
critical questions regarding how the Fourth Amendment should be
applied in the digital age.41 These cases, however, leave open the
critical question of whether historical cell phone location records
held by a service provider are protected by the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment.
As Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones
discussed, location records reveal extraordinarily sensitive details of
a person’s life, “reflect[ing] a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”42 Yet the
Eleventh Circuit analogized to the rather limited analog data that had
been addressed in the Supreme Court’s third-party records decisions
from the 1970s, and held that voluminous, digitized historical location records are unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.43 This was,
perhaps, unwise, as the Supreme Court recently cautioned that “any
extension of . . . reasoning [from decisions concerning analog
searches] to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.”44 The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless relied blindly on “pre-digital analogue[s]”
risks causing “a significant diminution of privacy.”45
39

Id. at 525 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
Id. at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting).
41
See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (warrant required
for search of cell phone seized incident to lawful arrest); see also United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (tracking car with GPS device is a Fourth
Amendment search).
42
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
43
Davis, 785 F.3d at 507–08 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
44
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
45
Id. at 2493.
40
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In seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court, Davis summarized the Court’s precedent as follows:
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court addressed the pervasive location monitoring made possible by GPS tracking technology surreptitiously and
warrantlessly attached to a vehicle.46 All members of
the Court agreed that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and tracking its movements constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment.47 In so holding, the
Court made clear that the government’s use of novel
digital surveillance technologies not in existence at
the framing of the Fourth Amendment does not escape the Fourth Amendment’s reach.48
In Riley v. California, the Court addressed Americans’ privacy rights in the contents of their cell
phones, unanimously holding that warrantless search
of the contents of a cell phone incident to a lawful
arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.49 In so doing,
the Court rejected the government’s inapt analogy to
other physical objects that have historically been
subject to warrantless search incident to an arrest.50
[Davis and similar cases] raise a hotly contested
question that sits at the confluence of Jones and Riley: whether the pervasive location data generated by

46

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
48
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34 (2001)) (“we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”); See also id.
at 964 (“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period”)
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
49
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
50
Id. at 2489 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative
sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”).
47
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use of a cell phone is protected from warrantless
search by the Fourth Amendment.51
Definitive resolution of this question, on which courts around
the country have disagreed, is necessary to provide guidance to law
enforcement and the public about the extent of Fourth Amendment
rights in the digital age.
Ready access to a complete map of a person’s movements raises
questions that have been long recognized as of particularly significance.52 As Judge Kozinski has observed,
[w]hen requests for cell phone location information
have become so numerous that the telephone company must develop a self-service website so that law
enforcement agents can retrieve user data from the
comfort of their desks, we can safely say that ‘such
dragnet-type law enforcement practices’ are already
in use.53
The protection of a warrant is needed to ensure that the Fourth
Amendment is not eviscerated as law enforcement accelerates its
warrantless access to huge stores of sensitive personal location data.
The use of cell phones is now prevalent, with “more than 90%
of American adults . . . own[ing] a cell phone,”54 more than 335 million wireless subscriber accounts in the United States,55 and 47 percent of households utilizing only cell phones.56 As Justice Alito recognized in Jones, cell phones are “[p]erhaps most significant” of the
51

Davis Petition at *15-* 16
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The Supreme Court
in [United States v.] Knotts [460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983)] expressly left open
whether ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country’ by means
of ‘dragnet-type law enforcement practices’ violates the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee of personal privacy.”).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 2490.
55
Annual Wireless Industry Survey, supra note 14.
56
Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January–June
2014, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 2014),
52
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“many new devices that permit the monitoring of a person’s movements.”57 Given the near-universal adoption of cellular technology,
it is no surprise that law enforcement has a growing appetite for cell
phone-related data.
Indeed, the government now requests a staggering quantity of
CSLI from service providers. In 2015, for example, AT&T received
76,340 requests for cell phone location data information.58 Of those,
58,189 were for historical CSLI.59 Verizon received approximately
20,298 requests for cell phone location data in just the second half
of 2015.60
In the case under discussion, the government seized Davis’s location data covering 67 days and 11,606 location data points.61 This
is in line with the average law enforcement request reported by one
major service provider, which “asks for approximately fifty-five
days of records.”62 Other recent cases involve even greater quantities of sensitive location information that was obtained without a
warrant. For example, in one case, the government was able to obtain 29,659 location points for one defendant from 221 days (over
seven months) of cell site location information.63 In another, the
government obtained 12,898 cell site location data points from 127
days of tracking.64

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201412.pdf. See also
Annual Wireless Industry Survey, supra note 14.
57
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
58
Transparency Report, AT&T 4 (2016), http://about.att.com/content/dam/csr/Transparency%20Reports/ATT_Transparency%20Report_Jan%202016.pdf.
59
Id.
60
Verizon’s Transparency Report for the 2nd Half of 2015, VERIZON 5
(2016), http://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-report/us-report/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2016).
61
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting).
62
Transparency Report for 2013 & 2014, T-MOBILE 5 (2015), http://newsroom.t-mobile.com/content/1020/files/ NewTransparencyReport.pdf.
63
United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 350 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc,
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).
64
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v. Carpenter, 2015 WL 1138148, No.
14-1572 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2015).
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Despite the breadth of these requests, law enforcement agencies
frequently obtain the CSLI data without a probable cause warrant.
One survey of public records request responses from roughly 250
local law enforcement agencies showed that “only a tiny minority
reported consistently obtaining a warrant and demonstrating probable cause” for CSLI.65 Given the ubiquity of cell phone usage, and
the heavy reliance on CSLI requests, it is important that courts settle
the question in a way that appropriately protects Fourth Amendment
rights.
Davis and similar cases are not only about the Fourth Amendment status of CSLI, but also address how the protections of the
Fourth Amendment apply to other sensitive and private data in the
hands of trusted third-parties.
As Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones,
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.66
Applying the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in Davis would not have required a wholesale reassessment of the thirdparty doctrine. But the courts must clarify how analog-age precedents in this area can be applied to digital surveillance techniques.
In the Davis panel decision, the court found that the third-party
doctrine does not apply to CSLI because the data was not voluntarily
conveyed to carriers, and because of the sensitivity of the data.67 In
the en banc dissent, Judge Martin agreed, expressing alarm that “the
65

Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, ACLU (Mar. 25,
2013), https://www.aclu.org/cases/cell-phone-location-tracking-public-recordsrequest.
66
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
67
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (stating that “there is reasonable privacy interest in being near the home of a lover, or a dispensary of medication, or a place of worship . . . we do not see the factual distinction as taking
Davis’s location outside his expectation of privacy.”).
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majority’s blunt application of the third-party doctrine threatens to
allow the government access to a staggering amount of information
that surely must be protected under the Fourth Amendment.”68 Yet
the en banc majority resolved the case with a straight application of
Smith, ignoring the significant changes over the intervening 35 years
in technology and expectations of privacy.69 Three concurring
judges wrote separately to register their concerns about exempting
the CSLI records at issue from Fourth Amendment protections, inviting the Court to clarify the scope of the rule announced in Miller
and Smith.70 Other courts are similarly divided.71
This struggle in applying pre-digital precedents from United
States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland is seen throughout the lower
courts.72 The principle taken from these cases, known as the “thirdparty doctrine,” provides that certain records or information shared
with third parties do not deserve Fourth Amendment protection.73
Smith involved short-term use of a pen register to capture the telephone numbers that a person dials, finding this not to be a Fourth
Amendment search.74 The decision was based in large part on the
fact that by dialing a number, the caller “voluntarily convey[s] numerical information to the telephone company.”75 In addition, the
Smith court evaluated the degree of invasiveness of the surveillance
68
69
70

Davis, 785 F.3d at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 521 (Jordan, J., concurring); Id. at 524–25 (Rosenbaum, J., concur-

ring).
71
Compare In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612–13 (5th Cir. 2013) (no expectation of privacy in CSLI
under Smith) and United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(same), with In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304,
317 (3d Cir. 2010) (distinguishing Smith and holding that cell phone users may
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI), and Graham, 824 F.3d at 444
(Wynn, J., dissenting) (“CSLI is not ‘voluntarily conveyed’ by a cell phone user,
and therefore is not subject to the third-party doctrine.”).
72
See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) and Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
73
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (noting the application of the
third-party doctrine and that “cell phone users voluntarily convey cell tower location information to telephone companies in the course of making and receiving
calls on their cell phones.”).
74
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
75
Id. at 744.
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in order to determine whether the user had a reasonable expectation
of privacy.76 For example, the Court noted the “pen register’s limited capabilities,”77 explaining that “‘a law enforcement official
could not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a
communication existed.’”78 Miller, a case involving bank depositor
transaction records voluntarily provided to the bank, resolved similarly.79
The struggle in defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s
protections for newer forms of sensitive digital data are reflected in
widespread scholarly criticism of the expansive application of the
third-party doctrine beyond the kinds of records at issue in Smith
and Miller.80 Scholars and judges have asked the Supreme Court to
ensure that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence keeps pace with technology’s rapid advance.
The Davis case offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to address the application of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
to sensitive and private records held by a third party. Deprived of
this guidance, a cell phone user “cannot know the scope of his
constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope
of his authority.”81 It is becoming increasingly urgent that the Court
provide a clear constitution rule governing location data and other
sensitive digital records.
A. The Federal Courts of Appeals and State High Courts Are
Divided.
The Davis en banc opinion further broadens the conflict over
whether and when sensitive cell phone location data held by a service provider is protected by a warrant requirement.

76

Id. at 741–42.
Id. at 742.
78
Id. at 741.
79
Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–42 (finding “no intrusion into any area in which
respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment interest”).
80
See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119,
122 (2002); Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087,
1151–52 (2002).
81
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981).
77
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1. IN FLORIDA, STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS ARE SPLIT OVER
THE EXISTENCE OF A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN

CSLI.
Florida law enforcement agents are now faced with a difficult
decision. They now must choose whether to follow the holding of
the state supreme court in Tracey v. State, and obtain a warrant before seizing CSLI, or whether to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Davis and proceed without a warrant. In Tracey, the Supreme
Court of Florida held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in real-time cell phone location
data, and that accordingly a warrant is required.82 Historical CSLI
records were not at issue in Tracey,83 but the court found that the
same principles that courts have held to create a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI also require protection of real–
time CSLI.84 Indeed, there is little meaningful difference between
historical and real-time records. Both offer information about a person’s private location, and both permit law enforcement to discover
a large quantity of private information about a person’s movements.
The historical records, if anything, are more intrusive because they
provide a window back in time.
Likewise, a number of states require a warrant for historical
CSLI by statute or under their state constitution as interpreted by the
state’s highest court.85 Additional states require a warrant for realtime cell phone location data.86 Requiring a warrant for CSLI as a
matter of federal constitutional law would harmonize the protections
available in state and federal investigations in these states as well.
Even if state and local law enforcement agencies elect to follow
Tracey, residents of Florida are nonetheless subject to varying
82

Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014).
Id. at 516.
84
Id. at 523.
85
See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 866 (Mass. 2014); CAL.
PENAL CODE §1546.1(b)(1) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-303.5(2) (2014);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 648 (2014); MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.28(3)(d), 626A.42(2)
(2014); MONT. CODE § 46-5-110(1)(a) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. § 644-A:2
(2015); UTAH CODE § 77-23c-102(1)(a) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 8102(b)(1).
86
See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 168/10 (2014); IND. CODE § 35-33-5-12 (2014); MD. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§ 1-203.1(b) (2015); VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(C) (2015).
83
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Fourth Amendment protections depending on whether they are investigated by state or federal agents. This variation, based on the
luck of the draw as to which agency investigates, is unacceptable.
2. THERE IS A CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THE THIRDPARTY DOCTRINE CIRCUMVENTS THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY IN A PERSON’S HISTORICAL CSLI.

Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit now holds that there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site location
information under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that no
warrant is required.87 In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell
Site Data, involved a magistrate judge who rejected a government
application for an order seeking historical CSLI, pursuant to the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).88 The judge held
that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant.89 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that cell users maintain an expectation of privacy in the data because they do not voluntarily convey to the service provider their location information.90 The Fifth
Circuit found that the cell service provider’s creation and possession
of the records eliminates any expectation of privacy in CSLI.91 More
recently, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit and a divided en banc
Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion.92

87
In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 613–14; see also United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358–59
(5th Cir. 2014) (applying Historical Site in the context of a suppression motion).
The Sixth Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to shorterterm real-time tracking of a cell phone user’s location during a single three-day
multi-state trip on public highways. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–
781 (6th Cir. 2012). The court reserved decision about “situations where police,
using otherwise legal methods, so comprehensively track a person’s activities that
the very comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Id. at 780 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957–64
(2012)).
91
Id. at 613.
92
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F. 3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

1198

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1

Other courts disagree. The Third Circuit has held that magistrate
judges have discretion to require a warrant for historical CSLI, in
those circumstances in which the location information implicates an
individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights by, for example, revealing when a person is inside a constitutionally protected space.93
The Third Circuit rejected the argument that a cell phone user’s expectation of privacy is eviscerated by the carrier’s ability to access
that information:
A cell phone customer has not “voluntarily” shared
his location information with a cellular provider in
any meaningful way. [ . . . ] [I]t is unlikely that cell
phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location information. Therefore, “[w]hen a cell phone user makes
a call, the only information that is voluntarily and
knowingly conveyed to the phone company is the
number that is dialed and there is no indication to the
user that making that call will also locate the caller;
when a cell phone user receives a call, he hasn’t voluntarily exposed anything at all.”94
For this reason, the court found that the third-party doctrine does
not apply to historical CSLI records.95 A divided panel of the Fourth
Circuit agreed with this view, “declin[ing] to apply the third-party
doctrine in the present case because a cell phone user does not ‘convey’ CSLI to her service provider at all—voluntarily or otherwise—
and therefore does not assume any risk of disclosure to law enforcement.”96 En banc reconsideration of the panel opinion is pending.

93

In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3rd
Cir. 2010).
94
Id. at 317–18.
95
Id.
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3. THERE IS A CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THERE IS A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN LONGER-TERM
LOCATION INFORMATION COLLECTED ELECTRONICALLY.
Circuits also are split over the question of expectation of privacy
in longer-term electronic data. The D.C. Circuit held in United
States v. Maynard that surreptitiously tracking a car over 28 days
using a GPS device violates reasonable expectations of privacy and
therefore constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.97 The court explained that
“[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such
as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not
do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than
does any individual trip viewed in isolation.”98
The court recognized that people have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the private information revealed by “prolonged GPS
monitoring.”99
This holding remains controlling law in the D.C. Circuit (though
the Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, relying on a trespassbased rationale.).100 The holding is not dependent on the particular
type of tracking technology at issue, as extended electronic surveillance of the location of a person’s cell phone is at least as invasive
as prolonged electronic surveillance of the location of a person’s vehicle.101

97

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
98
Id. at 562.
99
Id. at 563.
100
See Will Baude, Further Thoughts on the Precedential Status of Decisions
Affirmed on Alternate Grounds, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 3, 2013, 7:27
PM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/03/thoughts-precedential-status-decisions-affirmed-alternate-grounds/.
101
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that law enforcement access to cell phone location information is “[p]erhaps most significant” of the “many new devices that permit the monitoring of a
person’s movements.”).
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In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit went a different way, rejecting
this reasoning and opining that “reasonable expectations of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment do not turn on the quantity of noncontent information MetroPCS collected in its historical cell tower
location records.”102 The decision widened the circuit split over
whether people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
longer-term location information103
4. THERE IS A CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT APPLIES WHEN THERE IS A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN CSLI OR OTHER
ELECTRONICALLY COLLECTED LOCATION INFORMATION.

A circuit split also exists over whether a warrant is required
when there is, in fact, a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI
data. The en banc majority in Davis held that the government’s warrantless seizure and search of the records was reasonable, even if
Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI.104 This
alternative holding cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s
longstanding proscription that warrantless searches are “‘per se unreasonable.’”105

102

United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 515 (11th Cir. 2015).
Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(prolonged electronic location tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment),
with United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(holding that the “police did not conduct an impermissible search of PinedaMoreno’s car by monitoring its location with mobile tracking devices”), United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–99 (7th Cir. 2007) (prolonged electronic location tracking is not a search under the Fourth Amendment), and United States
v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A person traveling via automobile on public streets has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one locale to another.”).
104
Davis, 785 F.3d at 515.
105
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (quoting Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). See Orin Kerr, Eleventh Circuit Rules for the
Feds on Cell-Site Records – But Then Overreaches, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/05/eleventh-circuit-rules-for-the-feds-on-cell-site-records-but-then-overreaches/ (“[T]he
en banc court’s alternative holding . . . [is] a novel development of the law that
cuts against a lot of practice and precedent.”).
103
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Certain searches conducted outside the scope of traditional law
enforcement, or aimed at categories of people in specific circumstances where the expectation of privacy is reduced, may not require
probable cause warrants.106 In the CSLI cases, neither of these exceptions apply; no “special need” beyond regular normal law enforcement operation is served by the data requests. Indeed, even the
en banc Eleventh Circuit recognized that the government’s search
of Davis’s CSLI was in furtherance of “[t]he societal interest in
promptly apprehending criminals and preventing them from committing future offenses.”107 Neither Davis nor any other similarly
situated criminal suspect have a reduced expectation of privacy justifying rejection of the warrant requirement.108
The Eleventh Circuit’s alternate holding not only conflicts with
prior decisions of the Supreme Court, but also creates a split with
the courts that have required a warrant for law enforcement access
to CSLI and that have found there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in CSLI or other electronically collected location information.109
B. The En Banc Eleventh Circuit Erred In Holding That
Accessing Historical Cell Site Location Records From A Service
Prodicer Was Not A Search
The Eleventh Circuit majority found Davis’ position to be unsustainable merely because the government obtained the CSLI records from Davis’s cell carrier rather than directly from Davis, in
light of United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.110 This is a
106

See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
Davis, 785 F.3d at 518.
108
Cf. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (parolees); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995) (student athletes).
109
See Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (probable cause warrant required for tracking CSLI); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 866
(Mass. 2014) (same, under state constitution); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644
(N.J. 2013) (same); see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566–67
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that warrant is required for prolonged GPS tracking of
a car and rejecting application of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009) (warrant required
for GPS tracking under state constitution).
110
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015).
107
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misreading of applicable law. The Supreme Court should clarify that
a user’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his location data is not
eliminated, in and of itself, by a service provider’s access to that
data. While a third-party’s access to records may be a factor relevant to the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis, the
third-party doctrine set forth in Miller and Smith does not make the
fact of such access the sine qua non of Fourth Amendment protection. As the Court has repeatedly explained, limited third-party access to information or locations does not destroy otherwise-reasonable expectations of privacy.111
Instead, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test relies on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The mechanical application of
holdings from the analog age is improper in this new era involving
highly sensitive and voluminous digitized records.112 “[I]t is virtually impossible to participate fully in modern life without leaving a
trail of digital breadcrumbs that create a pervasive record of the most
sensitive aspects of our lives. Ensuring that technological advances

111

See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418–19 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (expectation of privacy in odors detectable by a police dog that emanate
from a home); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (information about location and movement in public,
even though exposed to public view); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29
(2001) (thermal signatures emanating from a home); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by
the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of
those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”);
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000) (bag exposed to the public on
luggage rack of bus); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990) (“an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home” even
though his possessions may be disturbed by “his host and those his host allows
inside”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1984) (reasonable expectation of privacy in letters and sealed packages entrusted to private freight carrier); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967) (reasonable expectation
of privacy in contents of phone call even though call is conducted over private
companies’ networks); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487–90 (1964) (implicit consent to janitorial personnel to enter motel room does not amount to consent for police to search room); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616–17
(1961) (search of a house invaded tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights even though
landlord had authority to enter house for some purposes).
112
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
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do not erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment,113
requires nuanced applications of analog-age precedents.”114
The conclusion that Davis retained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his CSLI does not require rejection of Smith and Miller,
but rather can be squared with those cases’ plain terms. The Supreme Court has looked to factors such as whether the records were
“voluntarily conveyed,”115 and what privacy interest a person has in
the information,116 when evaluating an individual’s expectation of
privacy in records held by a third party. As opposed to the dialed
phone numbers and limited bank records at issue in Smith and Miller, “[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”117
The location information that is tracked is not voluntarily entered by
the user into the phone, nor otherwise in any way affirmatively
transmitted to the carrier. This is even more the case when a person
receives a call, thereby taking no action that would knowingly or
voluntarily reveal location.
In addition the location records contained in CSLI are exceedingly sensitive and private. First, because people carry their phones
virtually everywhere they go, including inside their homes and other
constitutionally protected spaces, cell phone location records can reveal information about presence, location, and activity in those
spaces.
In United States v. Karo, the [Supreme Court] held
that location tracking implicates Fourth Amendment
privacy interests when it may reveal information
about individuals in areas where they have reasonable expectations of privacy.118 The Court explained
that using an electronic device—there, a beeper—to
113

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
Davis Petition at *30-*31 (internal quotation omitted).
115
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
116
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–42.
117
In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3rd
Cir. 2010).
118
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984).
114
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infer facts about ‘location[s] not open to visual surveillance,’ like whether ‘a particular article is actually located at a particular time in the private residence,’ or to later confirm that the article remains on
the premises, was just as unreasonable as physically
searching the location without a warrant.119 Such location tracking ‘falls within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment when it reveals information that could
not have been obtained through visual surveillance’
from a public place,120 regardless of whether it reveals that information directly or through inference.121
Second, CSLI data reveals a large amount of sensitive and private information about a person’s movements and activities in public and private spaces that, at least long-term, violates reasonable
expectations of privacy. The majority opinion in Jones relied on a
trespass-based rationale to find a search,122 making clear that “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz [reasonable expectation
of privacy] analysis.”123 Five Justices conducted a Katz analysis,
finding that (at least) longer-term location tracking violates reasonable expectations of privacy.124
This conclusion is not particularized to the type of tracking technology at issue in Jones. As Justice Alito identified, mobile devices
are “[p]erhaps most significant” of the emerging technologies capable of location tracking.125 The Supreme Court recently emphasized
this point, explaining that cell phone location data is particularly
sensitive because it “can reconstruct someone’s specific movements

119

Id.
Id. at 707
121
See Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (use of thermal imaging
device to learn information about interior of home constitutes a search). Davis
Petition at *32.
122
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
123
Id. at 953.
124
Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
125
Id. at 963.
120
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down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.”126
In Davis, the records obtained by the government implicated
both the expectation of privacy in longer-term location information
and in private spaces.127 These records told the government when
Davis slept at home and when he slept elsewhere.128 They showed,
nearly to the minute, his movements around his community.129 They
even allowed the government to learn with whom he associated and
when he did so.130
Recent data shows that more than 80 percent of people consider
“[d]etails of [their] physical location over time” to be “sensitive”—
evincing greater concern for this data than for the contents of their
text messages, a list of numbers they have called or websites they
have visited, or their relationship history.131 Historical CSLI enables
the government to “monitor and track our cell phones, and thus ourselves, with minimal expenditure of funds and manpower, [which]
is just the type of gradual and silent encroachment into the very details of our lives that we as a society must be vigilant to prevent.”132
III.
WHERE DAVIS LEADS
Davis and other cases concerning the Fourth Amendment’s application to historical CSLI raise fundamental questions about how
to apply the protections of the Bill of Rights, now more than 220
years old, to the digital age. As law enforcement agencies increasingly rely on access to sensitive troves of digital data held by thirdparty companies and deploy ever-more-sophisticated surveillance
126

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 955 (Sotomayer, J., concurring)).
127
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 539–41 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(Martin, J., Dissenting).
128
Davis, 785 F.3d at 540 (Martin, J., Dissenting).
129
Id.
130
See Trial Transcript at 12–14, United States v. Davis, No. 10-20896-CRGOLD (Feb. 6, 2012), ECF No. 283.
131
Public Perceptions of Privacy and Secuirty in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER 34
(Nov.
12,
2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-prviacy-perceptions/.
132
Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 522 (Fla. 2014).
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technologies, courts are struggling to keep up. The historical CSLI
cases preview a broader, percolating debate over how to apply the
third-party doctrine in the digital age and how to appropriately constrain the pervasive collection of location information using surreptitious surveillance devices.133
Cell site location information is far from the only sensitive information held in digital storage by third parties for which Fourth
Amendment protections are needed.134 Indeed, as the dissenting
judges in Davis wrote,
the majority’s blunt application of the third-party
doctrine threatens to allow the government access to
a staggering amount of information that surely must
be protected under the Fourth Amendment. Consider
the information that Google gets from users of its email and online search functions. According to its
website, Google collects information about you
(name, e-mail address, telephone number, and credit
card data); the things you do online (what videos you
watch, what websites you access, and how you view
and interact with advertisements); the devices you
use (which particular phone or computer you are
searching on); and your actual location . . . .Under a
plain reading of the majority’s rule, by allowing a
third-party company access to our e-mail accounts,
the websites we visit, and our search-engine history—all for legitimate business purposes—we give
up any privacy interest in that information.135
Although, ultimately, it may fall to the Supreme Court to explain
how to reconcile the analog-age third-party doctrine to digital-age
realities, state and federal courts cannot escape grappling with
Fourth Amendment protection for sensitive information held by a
third party.136
133

See generally Riley v. California, 134, S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v.
Jones, 1132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); United States v. Davis, 785 F. 3d 498 (11th Cir.
2015).
134
Davis, 785 F.3d at 535–36 (Martin, J., dissenting).
135
Id.
136
See Orin Kerr, supra note 103.
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In some areas, federal and state courts have extended the warrant
requirement to digital data held by a third party.137 Courts have held,
for example, that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of email stored on service providers’ servers, analogizing those records to the contents of letters entrusted to the postal
service.138 Recognizing that warrantless access to a phone company’s records of the phone numbers a person dials is permitted by
Smith v. Maryland, courts have distinguished so-called “post-cutthrough dialed digits,” which are “any numbers dialed from a telephone after the call is initially setup or ‘cut-through,’”139 on the basis
that they may contain sensitive information tantamount to the contents of a communication.140 A federal judge in Oregon rejected the
Drug Enforcement Administration’s practice of requesting prescription records held in a secure state prescription drug monitoring database with an administrative subpoena instead of a warrant. The
court held that the third-party doctrine does not apply because of the
sensitivity of the records and the lack of voluntary conveyance of
records incident to necessary medical care.141 State supreme courts
across the country have rejected application of the third-party doc-
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Id.
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286–88 (6th Cir. 2010); see also
Orin Kerr, supra note 103.
142
In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to
Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818 (S.D.
Tex. 2006) (stating “[s]ometimes these digits are other telephone numbers, as
when a party places a credit card call by first dialing the long distance carrier
access number and then the phone number of the intended party. Sometimes these
digits transmit real information, such as bank account numbers, Social Security
numbers, prescription numbers, and the like”).
140
Id.; accord In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d. 325, 337–39 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
141
Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (D. Or. 2014).
138
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trine under their states’ constitutions as applied to sensitive information such as dialed telephone numbers, bank records, medical
records, employment records, and other data.142
Yet, vast quantities of sensitive digital records are as-yet unprotected by judicial precedent. Private companies now hold copies of
individuals’ genetic profiles, potentially shedding light on familial
relationships and genetic diseases.143 Electricity providers retain increasingly granular power consumption data generated by “smart
meters,” which can show not only when a person is home, but even
which appliances she is using.144 Untold millions of family photos,
sensitive documents, and private communications are stored in the
cloud, on servers of companies offering the service for free or low
cost.145 AT&T retains records of every phone call to transit its network dating “as far back as 1987,” laying bare a generation’s worth
of contacts and associations of a vast number of Americans.146 Requests for third-party data can “allow[] the government to know
from YouTube.com what we watch, or Facebook.com what we post
or whom we ‘friend,’ or Amazon.com what we buy, or Wikipedia.com what we research, or Match.com whom we date.”147 These
records, of course, may be of acute interest to law enforcement in
criminal investigations,148 making the need for protective Fourth
Amendment rules paramount.
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Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the
Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from
Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 396–99 n. 118–28 (2006).
143
23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2016, 7:09
PM); ANCESTRY, http://www.ancestry.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2016; 7:17 PM).
144
Natasha Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L. REV.
1140, 1154–55 (2015).
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DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); FLICKR,
https://www.flickr.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); GOOGLE DRIVE,
https://www.google.com/drive (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
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Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove,
Eclipsing N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html.
147
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 536 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting).
148
See,
e.g.,
Transparency
Report,
23ANDME,
https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016); An-
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Davis and similar cases also open the door to discussion of legal
limits on other location tracking technologies used by law enforcement agencies directly, without the assistance of a third-party company. Law enforcement agencies across the country are increasingly
bypassing cellular service providers by surreptitiously deploying
“cell site simulators,” also known as Stingrays, to track and precisely locate cell phones.149 These devices mimic legitimate cell
phone towers, forcing all phones within range that use the impersonated cellular network to broadcast their unique electronic serial
numbers.150 By virtue of those transmissions the devices can precisely identify phones’ locations.151 Cell site simulators raise constitutional concerns because they can learn information about location
and activities within homes and other constitutionally protected
spaces, and can sweep in information about large numbers of bystanders’ phones in the process of searching for a particular suspect.152 Despite the widespread use of the technology,153 judicial
consideration of the Fourth Amendment issues has been slow to materialize, largely because police have wrapped their use of cell site
simulators in an incredible cloak of secrecy.154 Courts are beginning
cestry 2015 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, http://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016); United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n,
689 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the DEA’s subpoena for power
consumption records sought by the DEA was “relevant to a drug investigation,
was procedurally proper . . . was not overly broad, [and] complied with the Fourth
Amendment.”); SAN DIEGO GAS & ELEC. CO. 2014 ANNUAL PRIVACY REPORT
(2015),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=3287;
Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
149
See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret Stingray’s No
Secret Anymore:
The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National
Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14, 34–35 (2014).
150
See id. at 12.
151
See id.
152
See id.
153
See Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited
Mar. 25, 2016).
154
See In re Application of the United States for an Order Relating to Telephones Used by Suppressed, No. 15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
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to address the issue, which presents the issue of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for location information without the complication of the third-party doctrine.155
Use of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) also threatens
to give law enforcement access to large volumes of information
about people’s locations and movements. ALPRs, which are operated both by law enforcement and private companies, can log the
locations of many thousands of cars as they drive the streets, feeding
those records into massive databases that can trace a whole population’s movements and activities over space and time.156 Inconspicuous pole cameras, which can be trained on private residences and
record weeks or months of peoples’ comings and goings raise similar concerns.157 The rapidly expanding market for drone technology
raises the specter of police departments deploying fleets of small
flying surveillance platforms, containing cameras, microphones,
and even cell site simulators and other electronic surveillance gear.
These technologies erase the practical protections against pervasive
government monitoring that we, as a society, have long relied on.
As Justice Alito discussed in United States v. Jones,

Nov. 9, 2015); Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine
Crimes,
USA
TODAY
(Aug.
24,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cell-surveillance/31994181/; Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracks-phones-shhh-its-secret.html?_r=0; Jack Gillum & Eileen Sullivan, US Pushing Local Cops to Stay Mum on Surveillance, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 12, 2014), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-pushing-local-copsstay-174613067.html.
155
See State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
156
You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used To
Record
Americans’
Movements,
ACLU
(July
2013),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf;
Conor
Friedersdorf, An Unprecedented Threat to Privacy, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 27,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/vigilant-solutionssurveillance/427047/ (“[Vigilant Solutions] has taken roughly 2.2 billion licenseplate photos to date. Each month, it captures and permanently stores about 80
million additional geotagged images.”).
157
See United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 285 (6th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, at *1
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014), denying reconsideration and motion to dismiss,
United States v. Vargas, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 451 (E.D. Wash., Jan. 5, 2015).
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[i]n the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of
privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but
practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended
period of time was difficult and costly and therefore
rarely undertaken.158
However, with cell site simulators, networked ALPRs, pole
cameras, and any number of other surveillance technologies, the
power of police to amass detailed information about the movements
and activities of both suspects and large numbers of Americans going about their daily lives is growing. The need for courts and legislatures to provide strong protections for location information is
growing ever more pressing.
CONCLUSION
The legal system has always been playing catch up with technology. It is up to the judiciary to check the executive branch in its
continuing efforts to use technology in creative and aggressive
ways. Although the Supreme Court has embraced this role in recent
cases involving cell phones, courts of appeals must fill the gaps
around cell site location information, other forms of sensitive digital
data and invasive surveillance techniques. The circuit courts should
not follow the Eleventh Circuit in rotely invoking 1970s cases in
ways that make no sense when applied to today’s technology.
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United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment); accord id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[B]ecause GPS
monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and,
by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain
abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”).

